For the two-echelon supply chain with stable market demand, by taking the supplier's capital constraint into consideration, we establish a conditional and partial trade credit model, which actually is a Stackelberg model with the supplier being a leader in the game. By analyzing two parties' optimal decisions in the game, we provide the supplier with a threshold for setting the model. The model can not only stimulate the retailer to make a larger order at each replenishment cycle, but also incite the retailer to make a partial payment when he is in a good financial condition. Hence, the supplier's financial pressure is marginally relieved in this model. On the other hand, the retailer's benefit in the traditional trade credit model does not decrease. Thus, the new model makes the supply chain more stable and a win-win outcome can be realized. We illustrate the validity of the model via a set of numerical experiments. The sensitivity and the Pareto optimality of the model are also discussed in this paper.
Introduction
In classical economic order quantity model, the retailer generally pays for all the items ordered from a supplier upon completion of transaction. To stimulate the retailer to make a larger order at each replenishment cycle and thus decrease the order processing cost from the perspective of the supplier, many enterprises usually provide a trade credit policy to their retailers, that is, retailers are allowed to defer their payment for their order for some period, see, e.g., Haley and Higgins [1], Jamal et al. [2] , Jaggi et al. [3] . Nowadays, this strategy becomes more and more popular in developed and developing countries as shown in Chen and Wang [4] It should be noted that all the discussions above for trade credit policy are based on the assumption that the supplier is in a good financial condition. However, this is not the case as the circulation capital for each firm is frequently constrained in commercial activities, see Buzacott and Zhang [34] , Kouvelis and Zhao [35] . Actually, many firm's endurance capacity in debet is limited and larger balance due may lead large straits. Certainly, one remedy for this is to let retailer jointly bear the financial pressure in the trade credit model. Based on this, in this paper, we introduce a conditional discount strategy into the setting to stimulate the retailer in a good financial condition to make a partial payment when ordering. Surely, this can balance the supplier's profit from the delay in payment strategy and the financial pressure caused by the trade credit policy. The running pattern of the model is as follows: as the leader of the game, the supplier first set the related parameters such as threshold for trade credit policy (decision variable), the proportion of payment for the order and the discount factor for partial payment, then as a follower, the retailer makes his decision accordingly, if retailer's ordering quantity is less than the given threshold, then the retailer should make a full payment for the order with full purchasing price, otherwise, the retailer can either make a partial payment in proportion of payment and enjoy the price discount, or make a full delay in payment with full purchasing price. Certainly, two parties constitute a Stackelberg game with the supplier being a leader in the game. In the model, the retailer can not only make a larger order but also make a partial payment for the order when he is in a good financial condition. Hence, the supplier's financial pressure is relieved and the ordering processing cost can be marginally reduced from the perspective of the supplier. Meanwhile, the retailer's benefit in the traditional trade credit model is not reduced. Hence a win-win outcome can be realized in the model. By analyzing two parties' optimal decisions in the game, we provide the supplier with a threshold for setting the model. The validity of the model is illustrated via a set of numerical experiments and its sensitivity analysis is also provided in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notations and assumptions used in the paper. Section 3 considers the setting of the conditional trade credit model with capital constraints from the perspective of the supplier by analyzing the two parties' decisions in the game model. The sensitivity analysis of the model is also provided in this section. The Pareto optimality of the Stackelberg model is discussed in Section 4. The conclusion and some remarks are given in the last section.
Assumptions and notations
We first give the notations and then give the assumptions used in the subsequent analysis.
D annual market demand of the item; p unit selling price of the retailer; c unit purchasing cost of the retailer, c < p; A r fixed ordering cost of the retailer for each order; s discount coefficient of the purchasing price offered by the supplier when the retailer makes a partial payment for an order, s 2 ð0; 1. h r inventory holding cost per unit item per year of the retailer; s r opportunity cost of inventory capital per item per year of the retailer, which is measured by I r c where I r is the interest charges per $ investment in inventory per year;
